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Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard
Jonathan Klick Florida State University
Thomas Stratmann George Mason University
Abstract
In the face of rising rates of diabetes, many states have passed laws requiring
health insurance plans to cover medical treatments for the disease. Although
supporters of the mandates expect them to improve the health of diabetics, the
mandates have the potential to generate a moral hazard to the extent that medical
treatments might displace individual behavioral improvements. Another possibility is that the mandates do little to improve insurance coverage for most
individuals, as previous research on beneﬁt mandates has suggested that mandates often duplicate what plans already cover. To examine the effects of these
mandates, we employ a triple-differences methodology comparing the change
in the gap in body mass index (BMI) between diabetics and nondiabetics in
mandate and nonmandate states. We ﬁnd that mandates do generate a moral
hazard problem, with diabetics exhibiting higher BMIs after the adoption of
these mandates.

1. Introduction
Diabetes is a growing concern in the United States. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that more than 17 million people have
diabetes, and the incidence of the disease has been growing throughout the past
decade (CDC 2002). Among the complications induced by the disease are blindness, kidney disease, amputations, cardiovascular disease, and a host of other
life-threatening problems, placing diabetes as the sixth leading cause of death in
the United States. The American Diabetes Association (ADA) estimates that the
total cost of diabetes in 2002 in terms of direct medical care and indirect productivity losses amounted to $132 billion in the United States (ADA 2003).
In addition, analysts estimate that there are another 12 million Americans
with a condition known as prediabetes (Benjamin et al. 2003). The term pre-
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Table 1
Adoption of Diabetes Mandate
State

Year

State

Year

State

Year

Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana

2000
1998
1981
1998
1997
2000
1995
1998
2000
1998
1997
1984
1998
1997

Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Oklahoma

1996
2000
2000
1994
1998
2001
1999
1997
1997
1996
1997
1993
1997
1996

Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

2001
1998
1996
1999
1999
1997
1997
2000
1997
1998
1997
1996
1987
2001

diabetes covers individuals who are at a high risk for developing type 2 diabetes.1
The upward trend of obesity witnessed over the past 2 decades suggests that the
incidence of diabetes and prediabetes will continue to grow (Mokdad et al. 2003).
In this context, the legislatures of a majority of states have passed laws mandating that health insurance providers cover supplies, services, medications, and
equipment for treating diabetes as part of their basic coverage without charging
higher premiums for the coverage (see Table 1). Given the high cost of diabetes
treatments, advocates such as the ADA view these mandates as necessary for
ensuring that diabetics receive adequate health care.
As with most insurance coverage, these mandates have the potential to induce
moral hazard problems. That is, because type 2 diabetes can largely be avoided
through fastidious diet and exercise regimens, individuals facing the costs associated with diabetes have strong incentives to engage in healthful behavior.
When the cost of medical treatments declines because of state mandates, the
relative cost of behavioral prevention increases, inducing individuals to engage
in worse diet and exercise practices. On the margin, this moral hazard increases
the obesity incidence and eventually the diabetes incidence.
However, the mandates include coverage for self-management and education
programs that have the potential to improve the health of diabetics. Mandated
coverage for testing supplies has the potential to give diabetics improved awareness of their condition, inducing them to be more vigilant in their behavior.
The education provisions of mandates might improve access for diabetics to
dieticians and diabetes educators.
1
The phase between normal blood sugar levels and levels denoting type 2 diabetes is classiﬁed as
impaired glucose tolerance (IGT) or impaired fasting glucose (IFG). With IGT, the blood sugar level
is elevated (in the range of 140–199 milligrams per deciliter after a 2-hour oral glucose tolerance
test) but does not meet the standard for a type 2 diabetes diagnosis. With IFG, the fasting blood
sugar level is elevated (in the range of 110–125 milligrams per deciliter after an overnight fast) but
does not reach the type 2 diabetes threshold.

Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard

521

A third alternative is that these mandates do not actually change the coverage
available to people, as some previous research suggests that insurers often already
cover the beneﬁts included in the mandates. If this is the case, we might expect
that mandates do not change behavior unless passage of the mandate provides
individuals with better information regarding the coverage they already have.
Thus, the net effect of these mandates on individual health is ambiguous.
In this paper, we examine the health effects of diabetes mandates by focusing
on individuals’ body mass indexes (BMIs) for the period 1996–2000, during
which 34 states adopted mandates, by employing a triple-differences research
design in which we compare the change in the BMI gap between diabetics and
nondiabetics when a mandate is passed relative to the contemporaneous change
in the diabetic/nondiabetic gap in nonmandate states. We ﬁnd that mandates
generate a statistically signiﬁcant increase in the BMI of diabetics and that the
effect is of practical signiﬁcance. Speciﬁcations that insufﬁciently control for
factors that lead to the adoption of mandates generate spurious positive (that
is, decreases in BMI) treatment effects.2
In Section 2 of the paper, we discuss the existing literature on the economics
of obesity and diabetes. Section 3 provides the theoretical context for the expected
effect of diabetes mandates on behavior. Section 4 discusses our data and research
design. Results are presented in Sections 5 and 6, followed by concluding remarks.
2. Economics of Obesity and Diabetes
Perhaps owing to the recent trends in body weight, the topic of obesity has
gained much attention in the economics literature lately. Philipson and Posner
(2003) argue that the increase in obesity witnessed in the United States and
worldwide is a function of technological progress. That is, as technology has
lowered the price of food and has reduced the amount of on-the-job exercise
that typically takes place in modern American occupations, individuals consume
relatively more calories compared with the calories they expend than they did
in the past. This net increase in caloric intake more than offsets the effects of
increased dieting and recreational exercise.
In an extension of the basic Philipson and Posner framework, Lakdawalla and
Philipson (2002) test the major implications of the technological model of obesity.
They ﬁnd strong evidence that lower food prices, resulting from improvements
in agricultural technology, do lead to a statistically signiﬁcant increase in body
weights. Further, they provide some evidence that declining occupational physical
activity is also an important contributor to the increase in body weights.
Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro (2003) also adopt the technological explanation
for the rise in obesity, but they focus on the distribution of the increases in body
weights. They identify that the biggest technologically based increase in calorie
2
A previous version of this paper did not sufﬁciently control for this endogeneity and reported
only the spurious treatment effects.

522

The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS

consumption is exhibited in the heavy tail of the weight distribution. That is,
the increases in weight have been most pronounced for relatively heavy individuals. To explain this, they invoke a self-control model in which overweight
individuals have difﬁculties limiting their consumption when food prices decrease. They argue that price decreases are actually welfare reducing for this
segment of the population.
Chou, Grossman, and Saffer (2004) provide a separate economic explanation
for the increase in U.S. obesity rates. They use state data on the number of
restaurants in an individual’s home state and information regarding the price
of meals in various restaurants to explain a large proportion of the variation in
individuals’ BMIs. Although, as the authors admit, this approach potentially
suffers from a simultaneity bias, their results suggest that individuals facing
markets with relatively many restaurants and low food prices exhibit higher BMIs
and obesity incidence. They go on to argue that changing labor market opportunities for women are at the root of this effect. Basically, in years past, mothers
controlled the diets of families fairly effectively, but as more women entered the
workforce, families substituted with more preprepared and restaurant meals,
which are relatively unhealthful. They also attribute a large portion of the increase
in obesity to declining smoking rates.
The rise in obesity is not troubling per se. However, it is viewed as a public
health problem to the extent that obesity is a strong predictor for a number of
costly health problems. Although obesity is linked with a host of physical problems, its connection with diabetes is especially strong. In fact, type 2 diabetes is
almost completely limited to the overweight and obese. This implies that the
economic models of obesity also indirectly apply to diabetes.
Diabetes does present some interesting questions that are distinct from the
general issue of obesity. Speciﬁcally, while exercise and healthful diets can lower
the likelihood of both obesity and diabetes, there are also medical substitutes
for these behavioral treatments in the case of diabetes. Kahn (1999) highlights
how both behavioral modiﬁcations and medical treatments have signiﬁcantly
improved the quality of life for diabetics. One particular concern for Kahn is
the possibility that diabetic individuals substitute medical treatments for behavioral modiﬁcations. That is, do medicated diabetics become less fastidious in
various behaviors that increase their chances of developing complications from
diabetes, such as smoking and eating behaviors? While Kahn ﬁnds no evidence
of this substitution in his analysis, he notes that clinical diabeticians express
concern that improved access to medications for diabetes might lull individuals
into a false sense of security, causing them to ignore behavioral prescriptions.
Similar offsetting behavior has been documented in many other contexts in
the economics literature (see, for example, Peltzman 1975; Viscusi 1984). In the
case of diabetes, the possibility of offsetting behavior raises questions about the
ultimate aggregate effect of increasing access to medical treatments for diabetes.
Speciﬁcally, since complications from diabetes represent the costs of poor health
habits, the prospect of developing diabetes induces individuals, on the margin,
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to engage in more healthful behavior. Laws requiring insurers to cover medical
treatments for diabetes effectively subsidize less healthful behavior, potentially
leading more individuals to develop prediabetes and diabetes than would be the
case in the absence of these laws.3
3. Diabetic Behavior
We model a diabetic’s behavior as involving a choice to manage his or her
disease either through behavior modiﬁcation or through medical treatments. For
simplicity, we constrain behavior modiﬁcation to involve simply a choice regarding how many units of unhealthful food (f ) to consume at the nominal
price pf .4 Consumption of unhealthful food also increases the utility cost of
diabetes (D). The diabetic also chooses how many units of medical treatments
to consume (m) at price pm. Medical treatments do not enter the utility function
directly, but they lower the utility cost of diabetes. Thus, the diabetic individual
with income I faces the following optimization problem:
max U (f ) ⫺ D (f, m) ⫹ l (I ⫺ pf # f ⫺ pm # m) ,

(1)

f,m

which yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
⭸U ⭸D
⫺
⫺ lpf p 0
⭸f
⭸f

(2)

and
⫺

⭸D
⫺ lpm p 0.
⭸m

(3)

Substituting equation (3) into equation (2) yields
⭸U ⭸D pf ⭸D
⫺
⫹
p 0.
⭸f
⭸f pm ⭸m

(4)

By the implicit function theorem, then
⭸f
⭸pm

(

p ⫺ pf #

)Z(

⭸D ⭸U 2
⭸m

⭸f
2

⫺

⭸D 2
⭸ 2f

)

,

(5)

which implies that, as long as the individual’s utility function is concave in food
consumption and the incremental effect of food consumption on the severity
of diabetes costs is either constant or increasing (or even decreasing at a relatively
3
This is simply an application of the concept of moral hazard. Empirical analyses of the potential
for moral hazard in the insurance context can be found in Klick and Stratmann (2003, 2006). For
a general discussion of moral hazard arising from regulatory activity, see Klick and Mitchell (2006).
4
The intuition of the model does not change if we allow for a choice over healthful and unhealthful foods or if we add an exercise component.
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low rate), as the cost of medical treatments declines, the diabetic individual will
consume more unhealthful food. That is, we get the intuitive result that as the
price of medical treatments drops in relative terms, a rational individual will
substitute away from behavior modiﬁcations as a way of managing diabetes.5
Mandates requiring that medical treatments for diabetes are included in basic
insurance coverage effectively lower the price of those treatments. Thus, we might
expect that mandates produce deleterious health effects.
However, given the high cost of providing medical treatments for diabetes,6
insurers may focus much of their efforts on the proactive aspects of the mandates,
such as the coverage of consultations with dieticians and the provision of selfmanagement supplies. Because mandates restrict insurers from pricing the diabetes risk into their premiums, insurers might engage in active preventive management to mitigate the risk posed by diabetes mandates.7 Active management
has the potential to reap large cost savings with respect to diabetes since behavioral modiﬁcations signiﬁcantly reduce diabetes incidence.8 Improving access
to devices that monitor an individual’s blood sugar level has the potential to
make diabetics more aware of their condition, improving their compliance with
the diet and exercise directives issued by doctors. Further, covering the cost of
education programs could make a doctor more likely to suggest that a patient
visit a professional dietician or diabetes educator. Even if doctors regularly suggest
education programs, insurance coverage might make it more likely that patients
will follow through on the suggestion (Guglielmo 2001).
However, with respect to self-management and education, if these options are
effective in improving the behavior of diabetics, arguably, insurers would be
likely to cover them even in the absence of a mandate. As indicated above,
complications from diabetes, which would generally be covered by an insurer
even if it excluded direct diabetes treatments, tend to be very expensive, making
prevention and mitigation potentially good investments. Thus, it could be the
case that mandating coverage for self-management supplies and education is
superﬂuous.
Speciﬁcally, assume that there is a preventive treatment that costs an insurer
c per period to provide. This treatment guarantees that its customer will not
5
Gary Becker has recently offered a similar explanation of why Americans in general remain fat.
In effect, he argues that individuals rationally expect science to advance to the point where medical
technology can alleviate the negative health effects of obesity (Reuters News Service 2005).
6
Peele, Lave, and Songer (2002) estimate that health care expenditures by insurers were 3 times
higher for diabetics compared with all consumers in the examined health plans.
7
Another avoidance strategy is raised by Summers (1989). He argues that, in the presence of
mandates, if employers cannot adjust wages to account for differential beneﬁt costs, they will seek
to hire low-risk employees. Jensen, Cotter, and Morrisey (1995) demonstrate that another avoidance
strategy employed by ﬁrms is to self-insure so that state mandates are preempted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829), although their results
suggest that ﬁrms had stopped moving toward self-insurance as a strategy to avoid the burden of
state mandates by the mid-1980s.
8
Hu et al. (2001) ﬁnd that more than 90 percent of cases of type 2 diabetes could be prevented
by the adoption of a more healthful lifestyle.
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develop diabetes. Further, assume that in the event the customer does not receive
the preventive treatment, his or her likelihood of developing diabetes is represented by the probability distribution function p(t). That is, the likelihood of
developing diabetes is only a function of time (t) and ⭸p/⭸t 1 0.
If the customer develops diabetes, the insurer will incur per-period cost m.
If the insurer provides the preventive treatment, it can charge an additional
premium of h.9 Assuming the insurer has discount rate r and the insured customer is covered by the insurer from period 0 to period T, the insurer’s decision
rule for whether it provides the preventive treatment is to provide the treatment
when the following condition is met:

冕
T

0

冕
T

e⫺rtmp (t) dt x

e⫺rt (c ⫺ h) dt.

(6)

0

In work examining other kinds of insurance mandates, Gruber (1994a) has
found that mandates generally do not expand coverage because employers already
often cover the services that are the subject of the mandate.10 If plans already
cover diabetes treatments, the mandates could still have an effect if customers
are generally ignorant about their coverage and mandates make them aware that
they do have coverage.11
Diabetes coverage might be slightly different in this regard, however. That is,
given the structure of the disease, preventive efforts that might be cost justiﬁed
over a patient’s lifetime might not be a good investment from the standpoint
of an insurer. Because the major costs of diabetes complications arise primarily
in old age, insurers might rationally calculate that the beneﬁts of preventive
treatments will be reaped by Medicare rather than accrue to the insurer. Even
if it is likely that the complication will arise before the customer reaches Medicare
age, insurers might hesitate to cover preventive care if there is substantial movement in and out of insurance plans.12
Under these conditions, it will not be possible for a given insurer to internalize
the beneﬁts of preventive care. In that case, mandates may serve as a coordination
mechanism inducing insurers to cover preventive treatments that are cost justiﬁed
in a social sense.
9
Note it may not be possible to set h at the level at which all cost-justiﬁed preventive treatments
are provided because of regulatory constraints on pricing or differentials between the discount rates
of the customers and those of the insurer.
10
Gruber’s research did not include diabetes mandates, and there is some limited evidence that
such mandates are different in this regard. For example, Pollitz et al. (2005, pp. 36–37) document
a number of state reports that ﬁnd that diabetes beneﬁt mandates will increase coverage for state
residents because the mandates go beyond what insurers already cover in general, although they note
that insurers in Maine did not expect to have to change coverage very much.
11
Consumer ignorance of coverage can impede patients from availing themselves of important
preventive treatments. See, for example, Parente, Salkever, and DaVanzo (2005).
12
Pollitz et al. (2005) note that the majority of individual health insurance policies are held for
less than 2 years.
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4. Research Design
The adoption of diabetes mandates provides us with the opportunity to examine the incentive effects of increased treatment access on the behavior of
individuals. In general, isolating the causal effect of treatment availability is
difﬁcult, since improved health technology represents a shock in availability to
everyone, which leaves analysts without a control group against which to measure
the marginal effect of improved access. If one focuses not on technology but
rather on price changes, as is the case in expanded insurance coverage, there is
the potential that election of insurance and personal health behaviors are jointly
determined.
With the adoption of mandates, however, the exogenous increase in access to
diabetes treatments that applies to individuals in the adopting state also provides
us with an interesting quasi-experiment. Speciﬁcally, within a state, we can examine the change occasioned by passage of a mandate in the gap between BMI
exhibited by diabetics controlling for contemporaneous changes in the state as
observed in nondiabetics in the state. Further, we can control for time effects
that are unrelated to the adoption of insurance mandates by using diabetics and
nondiabetics in nonmandate states as controls.
We use individual-level data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System (BRFSS) for the years 1996–2000 to analyze the effects of diabetes mandates. We chose 1996 as our starting point because it represents the ﬁrst year
that all states took part in the BRFSS.13 Our measure of health is BMI.14 Body
mass index is a normalized weight metric used to classify an individual’s weight
status. Individuals with BMIs 25 and above are considered overweight, while
patients with a BMI of 30 or greater are considered obese.
We estimate the regression
BMI ijt p a # Diabeticit # Mandatejt ⫹ b # Mandatejt

(7)

⫹ d # Diabeticit ⫹ V # X it ⫹ ri ⫹ tt ⫹ uj ⫹ ijt,
where BMI represents individual i’s BMI calculated from his or her survey
responses regarding height and weight at time t. The Diabetic # Mandate interaction takes the value of one if the individual’s state of residence (j) has a
mandate in effect during survey year t and if the individual has diabetes. The
Mandate variable takes the value of one if the individual’s state has a mandate
in effect regardless of whether the individual has diabetes (and is affected by the
mandate) or not (and is not affected by the mandate). The variable Diabetic
takes the value of one if the individual is diabetic to control for the fact that
diabetics, whether covered by mandates or not, tend to exhibit higher BMIs.
13
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (http:
//www.cdc.gov/brfss/). We chose 2000 as our endpoint because after that year some of the variables
we use in our analysis were no longer collected.
14
BMI p [(Weight in pounds) / (Height in inches)2 ] # 703.
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The vector X has individual-level covariates, r represents a time-invariant race
effect corresponding to i’s reported race, t represents the effect of year t that is
common to all individuals surveyed in the same year as i, and u represents a
time-invariant state effect that is common for all individuals living in state j.
We also examine speciﬁcations in which we control for state-speciﬁc trends and
other speciﬁcations for which we allow for state-speciﬁc year dummies.
For our covariates, we include the individual’s age and age squared, recognizing
that individuals tend to gain weight as they age but then reach an age at which
weight actually declines. We also include income and income squared, expecting
that thinness is a normal good in the United States but that at some point the
effect of food being a normal good as well might overwhelm the demand for
thinness.15 We include the individual’s education level since education serves as
a proxy for an individual’s subjective discount rate (Fuchs 1982). We expect that
individuals with low discount rates will invest in both education and health. We
also control for whether an individual is unemployed since unemployed individuals are likely to be less active than their employed counterparts, conditional
on income levels.
We also control for the individual’s insurance status, recognizing that the
choice to buy insurance might correlate with health preferences. Another measure
of health preferences that we include is whether the individual smokes cigarettes.
Finally, we control for a number of other lifestyle attributes such as whether the
individual is married, separated, or divorced, the number of children the individual has, the gender of the individual, and whether the individual is pregnant
at the time of the survey. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.
If the moral hazard effect of the diabetes mandates dominates, we should
observe a positive coefﬁcient on the Diabetic # Mandate interaction term, and
we might expect a positive coefﬁcient on the mandate term in general if nondiabetics rely on their expectation of insurance coverage in the event that they
develop diabetes in the future. However, if the mandates are successful in improving the health of diabetics, we should observe a negative coefﬁcient on the
Diabetic # Mandate term.
5. Results
We present the results of the regressions described in Table 3. In the speciﬁcation including general year dummies (column 1), the treatment group
(Diabetic # Mandate) exhibits a BMI reduction of .4, which represents a decrease of about 2 percent, and the result is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level. Interestingly, the nondiabetic population in mandate states appears to
exhibit the effects of moral hazard, as the passage of the mandate increases BMI
among this group by .07. Although the effect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1
15
Philipson and Posner (2003) argue that the quadratic will imply increasing weight at low income
levels and decreasing weight at higher income levels. However, given the relative wealth of the United
States, we do not expect to ﬁnd such a relationship in this data.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics

Variable
BMI
Total sample
Diabetics excluded
Diabetics only
Diabetic
Mandate
Diabetic # Mandate
Income
Age
Female
Pregnant
Education
Smoker
Married
Separated/divorced
Children
Unemployed
Insured
Contribution prohibition
Term limit

Description

Mean

SD

26.052
25.850
29.611
.054
.563
.032

5.117
4.957
6.415
.226
.496
.178

38.649
46.669
.590
.014
4.665
.237
.542
.157
.734
.034
.877
.407

21.643
17.378
.492
.119
1.097
.447
.498
.364
1.138
.181
.329
.491

.177

.382

Body mass index

Equals one if diabetic
Equals one if in a mandate state
Equals one if individual lives in a mandate
state and is diabetic
Income ($1,000s)
Age (years)
Equals one if female
Equals one if currently pregnant
Education level reported (scale of 1–6)
Equals one if smoker
Equals one if married
Equals one if divorced or separated
Number of children (ages 18 and under)
Equals one if currently unemployed
Equals one if insured
Equals one if state currently prohibits
corporations from making campaign
contributions to state legislators
Equals one if state currently limits the
amount of time an individual can serve
in the state legislature’s lower house

Source. All data are from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System (http://www.cdc.gov/brfss/), for the years 1996–2000, except for contribution prohibition (Feigenbaum and Palmer 1980–2000) and term limit (National Conference of State Legislatures 2006).

percent level, the relative effect is very small (.2 percent). The coefﬁcients on
the covariates all yield the expected results. In total, the regression explains almost
10 percent of the variation in BMI.
We introduce state-speciﬁc trends in the speciﬁcation presented in column 2.
The Diabetic # Mandate interaction coefﬁcient does not change in size or statistical signiﬁcance, as it still implies a treatment effect of the mandates of about
a 2 percent reduction in BMI. The moral hazard effect in the nondiabetic population of mandate states, however, loses statistical signiﬁcance. The results for
the other coefﬁcients are unaffected, and we continue to explain about 10 percent
of the variation in the data.
Because of the large size of our data set, we are able to include an additional
speciﬁcation that controls for state-speciﬁc year effects. We present results with
these controls in column 3. Again, we ﬁnd a treatment effect among diabetics
in mandate states of about 2 percent. This reduction is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level. We continue to explain about 10 percent of the data’s
variation, and the coefﬁcients on the covariates are largely robust to this speciﬁcation.
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Table 3
Effect of Diabetes Mandates on Body Mass Index
(1)
Variable
Diabetic # Mandate
Mandate
Diabetic
Income
Income2
Age
Age2
Female
Pregnant
Education
Smoker
Married
Separated/divorced
Children
Unemployed
Insurance
Time control
Adjusted R2

Coefﬁcient

Robust SE

⫺.404
.092
.071
.027
3.043
.067
⫺.021
.002
.004
.002
.312
.003
⫺.003
.000
⫺1.407
.015
.963
.065
⫺.289
.008
⫺.704
.016
.065
.020
⫺.394
.025
.056
.007
.094
.045
.063
.024
Year dummies
.098

(2)
Coefﬁcient

Robust SE

⫺.411
.092
⫺.047
.034
3.047
.067
⫺.022
.002
.004
.002
.313
.003
⫺.003
.000
⫺1.389
.015
.956
.065
⫺.290
.008
⫺.700
.016
.060
.020
⫺.399
.025
.054
.007
.091
.045
.064
.024
State trends
.098

(3)
Coefﬁcient Robust SE
⫺.404
.092
. . .
3.041
.067
⫺.022
.002
.004
.002
.312
.003
⫺.003
.000
⫺1.408
.015
.963
.065
⫺.289
.008
⫺.703
.016
.063
.020
⫺.396
.025
.055
.007
.092
.045
.065
.024
State-year dummies
.098

Note. The dependent variable is BMI as reported in Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System (http://www.cdc.gov/brfss/), for the years 1996–2000. All regressions include
state and race effects. The coefﬁcient for Income2 has been multiplied by 100 for presentation. N p
466,805.

6. Is the Effect Causal?
The identiﬁcation strategy used above relies on the exogenous adoption of
mandates by states. That is, if the decision to adopt a diabetes mandate depends
on the expectations of a state legislature regarding the health of diabetics in their
state, then our treatment effect would suffer from a simultaneity bias. For example, if a legislature observes indications that the health of diabetics is getting
worse and it decides to pass a mandate to mitigate the health problems of
diabetics on that basis, then the estimated treatment effect would exhibit a
downward bias. On the other hand, if insurers tend to ﬁght beneﬁt mandates
that are costly to them, mandates might pass only in those states in which insurers
observe indications that the health of diabetics is getting better. In that case, the
estimated treatment effect would exhibit an upward bias.
To rule out the potential for simultaneity, we exploit the differences-indifferences-in-differences model (DDD) introduced by Gruber (1994b). This
model imposes less restrictive assumptions regarding the exogeneity of the policy
shock in that it controls for trends that are speciﬁc to diabetics as well as any
idiosyncratic attributes that differentiate the diabetics in mandate states from
diabetics in nonmandate states.
Following Gruber, we initially focus attention on two subsets of states: (1) the
treatment group includes those eight states that adopted mandates in 1998, which
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Table 4
Effect of Diabetes Mandates on Body Mass Index: Nonadopting
States and States Adopting in 1988
Variable
b8
b7
b6
b5
b4
b3
b2

(Treatment effect)
(Diabetics in mandate states)
(Diabetics 1998⫹ effect)
(Mandate states 1998⫹ effect)
(Diabetics)
(Mandate state effect)
(1998⫹ Effect)

Coefﬁcient

Robust SE

1.716
⫺1.827
1.502
.105
2.786
⫺.037
⫺.617

.296
.200
.208
.049
.173
.036
.032

Note. Results are from a triple-differences model using only nonadopting states
and states that adopted mandates in 1998. Data are from Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (http://
www.cdc.gov/brfss/), for the years 1996–2000. In addition to the controls presented
here, this model includes the covariates presented in Table 3, and the estimated
coefﬁcients were qualitatively similar. N p 174,318; R2 p .096.

is the midpoint of our sample, and (2) the eight states that did not adopt
mandates before or during our sample period. We then estimate the following
model:
BMI ijt p b1X ijt ⫹ b2tt ⫹ b3 dj ⫹ b4Diabetici ⫹ b5 (dj # tt)

(8)

⫹ b6 (tt # Diabetici) ⫹ b7 (dj # Diabetici) ⫹ b8 (tt # dj # Diabetici) ,
where i indexes individuals, t indexes the time period (where zero stands for
years before the mandate passes in 1998 and one stands for 1998 and later), and
j indexes states (where one stands for states that pass a diabetes mandate in 1998
and zero stands for states that do not pass mandates). Collapsing our data into
these groupings (as does Gruber) allows for a more direct application of the
treatment/control framework. The vector X stands for the observable variables
we control for in Table 3; t represents a ﬁxed post-treatment-year effect common
to all observations occurring in 1998 or later, and d controls for ﬁxed differences
between states that adopt mandates and states that do not and is common to
all observations in states that pass mandates in 1998. The variable Diabetic again
measures whether an individual is diabetic and therefore captures any ﬁxed BMI
differences between diabetics and nondiabetics. The interaction carrying the b5
coefﬁcient controls for any time effect that is common to all individuals in
mandate states after adoption of the mandate. The b6 coefﬁcient controls for
any time effect that is common to all diabetic individuals after adoption of the
mandate. The b7 coefﬁcient controls for any idiosyncratic differences common
to diabetic individuals in mandate states that are constant pre- and postadoption.
Thus, b8 represents the causal treatment effect, as it isolates the effect of the
mandate on a mandate-state diabetic.
We present the results of this model in Table 4. Interestingly, this more powerful
model indicates that the treatment effect of diabetes mandates is to increase the
BMI of affected diabetics by 1.7 points, which is an increase of almost 6 percent,
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Figure 1. Trends in diabetic body mass index premium

and the effect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Examining the
coefﬁcients of the interactions provides some insight into the bias present in
our earlier estimates. Speciﬁcally, it appears as though the mandate states as a
group had diabetic residents who were relatively healthy compared with the
diabetics in nonmandate states. Further confounding our results were the facts
that mandate states experienced an upward trend in BMI among nondiabetic
residents and that diabetics in general exhibited increases in BMI. This is also
demonstrated in Figure 1, which provides two piecewise linear graphs16 of the
“diabetes premium” in BMI (that is, average diabetic BMI ⫺ nondiabetic BMI)
for the eight states adopting mandates in 1998 and the eight states that did not
adopt mandates during our time period.17
Although these results are, at a minimum, evidence that our earlier results
contain a serious bias, the question of whether these mandates generally created
a moral hazard problem deserves more attention. It could be the case that
16
We generated linear trends for both groups for the periods 1996–98 and 1998–2000 to identify
the change in trends occurring in 1998 when the adopters implemented mandates.
17
We also graphed the diabetes premiums for each of the eight adopting states to ensure that the
effect is not completely driven by a single state. From those graphs, it appears as though ﬁve of the
adopting states exhibit the pattern (Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania), while
one appears to simply continue an upward trend around 1998 (Virginia), and the two remaining
states exhibit the opposite effect (Colorado and Kentucky). These graphs are available from the
authors on request.
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Table 5
Effect of Diabetes Mandates on Body Mass Index: All States
Variable
w6 (Treatment effect)
w5 (Diabetics in mandate states)
w3 (Diabetic)

Coefﬁcient

Robust SE

.401
⫺1.104
3.135

.126
.137
.160

Note. Results are from a triple-differences model using all states. Data are from
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System (http://www.cdc.gov/brfss/), for the years 1996–2000. In addition to the
controls presented here, this model included the covariates presented in Table 3,
and the estimated coefﬁcients were qualitatively similar. This model also includes
diabetic-speciﬁc year dummies and state-speciﬁc year dummies. N p 466,805;
R2 p .099.

restricting our attention to only 16 states distorts our view of what effect mandates have. Perhaps these states were systematically different than other states.
Further, we fail to exploit some available variation by compressing our 5 years
of data into a simple before and after structure. Also, collapsing all states into
the distinction between mandate and no-mandate states disregards any idiosyncratic differences that exist within the groups.
To mitigate these concerns, we use Gruber’s DDD intuition, but we drop the
data structure he uses. Instead, we examine all states using the following model:
BMI ijt p w1X ijt ⫹ w2 (tt # dj) ⫹ w3 Diabetici ⫹ w4 (tt # Diabetici)

(9)

⫹ w5 (dj # Diabetici) ⫹ w6 (tt # dj # Diabetici) ,
where the model has a structure similar to that of the DDD model presented
above, where i indicates an individual, t denotes a year (that is, we no longer
collapse all years into pre- or post-1998), and j indicates the state of residence
of the individual (that is, we do not collapse into mandate or nonmandate states).
Again we control for observable differences across individuals with the X vector.
Instead of time and state effects, in this model we allow for state-speciﬁc year
effects with the w2 interaction. We again control for a diabetic-speciﬁc effect with
w3. We also allow for separate diabetes year effects with w4. This control will
capture any national changes in diabetic treatment such as innovations in diabetes
pills or new diet directives from the CDC. The variable w5 controls for baseline
differences in the diabetic populations of states that eventually adopt mandates,
and w6 isolates our treatment effect (that is, the change in diabetic BMI after
adoption of a mandate relative to contemporaneous changes relative to BMI
baseline in the state as a whole and relative to contemporaneous changes in
diabetic BMI nationally, conditional on variation in the observed covariates).
We present the results from this less restrictive model in Table 5. Our estimated
treatment effect is an increase in BMI among diabetics in mandate states of .4
points, which represents an increase of 1.4 percent. This result is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
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Thus, our more powerful statistical models indicate that the true causal effect
of passing diabetes mandates is to generate a moral hazard such that diabetics
rely more on medical treatments for their disease than on improvements in their
diets or exercise patterns.
It is likely that our estimated treatment effect is biased toward zero since
mandates apply only to a subset of a state’s population because of federal preemption under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
which largely exempts self-insured employers’ health insurance plans from state
mandates. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know from the data collected in
BRFSS whether an individual’s health insurance is covered under ERISA. Also,
there are no comprehensive state-level data tracking the proportion of a state’s
population that falls under ERISA, which makes it impossible to design a credible
index for a more precise mandate variable (Klick and Markowitz 2006). In effect
then, our estimated treatment effect should be viewed as a pooled estimate in
which the effect of mandates on the individuals to which the mandate applies
is averaged with a zero effect for all the individuals falling under ERISA preemption. It is likely then that the true causal effect is somewhat larger than the
BMI increase described above.
The BRFSS does contain one potential proxy for ERISA status. During the
years of our analysis, the BRFSS asked individuals where they obtained their
insurance. If we assume that those individuals who answered that they received
their coverage through their employer (or spouse’s employer) are less likely to
fall under state mandates because of ERISA preemption relative to those individuals who indicated that they bought their insurance independently (as indicated by Jensen, Cotter, and Morrisey [1995]), we might be able to estimate
a more precise treatment effect if we use the self-purchase individuals in mandate
states as the treatment group, with employer-insured and uninsured individuals
as the within-state control.18 For this analysis, we focus only on diabetics since
it is only non-ERISA-preempted diabetics who are affected by state mandates.
Because this restriction limits our sample size, it is not possible to estimate the
less restrictive DDD model presented in equation (3). Instead, we once again
employ Gruber’s pooling method, estimating
BMI ijt p g1X ijt ⫹ g2tt ⫹ g3 dj ⫹ g4Independent Insurancei ⫹ g5 (dj # tt)
⫹ g6 (tt # Independent Insurancei) ⫹ g7 (dj # Independent Insurancei)
⫹ g8 (tt # dj # Independent Insurancei) ,

(10)

in which, once again, the time dimension is collapsed into two periods, pre1998 and 1998 onward (with g2 measuring the period effect), and we restrict
18
Note that mandates in general did not exempt nongroup policies from the coverage requirements.
For summaries and statute citations for the relevant laws, see National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Mandating Diabetes Health Coverage (http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/
diabetes.htm).
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Table 6
Effect of Diabetes Mandates on Body Mass Index with Independent
Insurance as a Proxy for Mandate Coverage
Variable
g8
g7
g6
g5
g4
g3
g2

(Treatment effect)
(Independently insured in mandate states)
(Independently insured 1998⫹ effect)
(Mandate states 1998⫹ effect)
(Independently insured)
(Mandate state effect)
(1998⫹ Effect)

Coefﬁcient

Robust SE

2.922
⫺1.674
2.026
⫺.143
⫺1.822
⫺.218
⫺1.088

1.432
1.102
1.101
.321
.773
.239
.251

Note. Results are from a triple-differences model using only diabetics in nonadopting states
and states that adopted mandates in 1998. Data are from Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (http://www.cdc.gov/brfss/), for the years
1996–2000. In addition to the controls presented here, this model included the covariates
presented in Table 3 except diabetic, and the estimated coefﬁcients were qualitatively similar.
N p 6,814; R2 p .165.

attention to only those eight states passing mandates in 1998 and states that
passed no mandate before or during our period of analysis. As before, states are
treated as falling within the mandate or nonmandate group; thus g3 measures
the time-invariant group effect. Independent Insurance represents a dummy
variable that indicates that the individual purchased his or her insurance independently of his or her employer or spouse’s employer. The variable g5 captures
the mandate group postmandate time effect, g6 controls for the independent
insurance post-1998 time effect, and g7 controls for any idiosyncratic differences
regarding the independent insurance group in mandate states; g8 then represents
the treatment effect.
If our non-ERISA proxy does provide us with more precision regarding who
is covered by state mandates, we should estimate a treatment effect that exceeds
the increase in BMI of 1.7 points that we estimated in Table 4. We present the
results of this potentially more precise model in Table 6. Our estimates suggest
a moral hazard effect of 2.9 points among the independently insured individuals
affected by mandates. This result is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level,
and it represents a relative BMI increase of almost 10 percent.
One ﬁnal robustness check that we performed involved endogenizing the
adoption of a diabetes mandate. Given that the treatment effect estimated in
our earlier models involved interaction terms to allow us to use unaffected
individuals in that state as a within-state control group, we will not be able to
duplicate those models in an instrumental variables (IV) framework. To implement an IV model, we restricted our attention to diabetics only, performing a
simple difference-in-difference model that compares the change in diabetic BMI
occasioned by the passage of a beneﬁt mandate relative to contemporaneous
BMI changes in the diabetic population of nonmandate states. For our instruments, we investigate the use of (1) an indicator measuring whether the state
had restrictions in place that bar corporations from making campaign contri-
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butions to state legislators and (2) an indicator for whether the state has term
limits in place for its state legislature.19
The intuition behind our ﬁrst instrument involves the fact that insurers generally oppose beneﬁt mandates and are likely to lobby against them. If insurers
are prohibited from making contributions to legislators, their lobbying efforts
will be less likely to be successful. The second instrument captures the likelihood
that term limits change legislators’ incentives. Speciﬁcally, while facing the discipline of elections, legislators may be more beholden to populist interests, like
expanding health insurance coverage. However, if legislators are faced with the
prospect of having to ﬁnd a job in the private sector or go into business for
themselves when term limits bind, they may be less willing to impose additional
costs on businesses through mandated beneﬁts.
While intuitively it seems as though these two variables are unrelated to the
health characteristics of state residents, one might worry that these variables
correlate with general political preferences in a state that also affect the health
of residents. If that were the case, the instruments would not be orthogonal to
BMI. Fortunately, both of these variables are highly inﬂuenced by actions undertaken by state courts, which are much less likely to be correlated with other
political and policy characteristics within the state. Speciﬁcally, for a nontrivial
number of states, both campaign contributions and term limits have been invalidated by state courts after legislatures adopted them. For term limits, the
possibility is further attenuated by the fact that most term limits are adopted
many years before they actually go into effect (and, therefore, before they show
up in our coding). Furthermore, it is likely that state ﬁxed effects in the ﬁrst
stage of the IV regression will mitigate the effects of any generic political and
policy characteristics that could be correlated with both the adoption of these
policies and state health characteristics. Finally, we also provide diagnostic tests
suggesting that the instruments are rightfully excluded in the second stage of
the IV regression.
We present the results of our IV analysis in Table 7. Our instruments perform
well in the ﬁrst-stage regression, generating a ﬁrst-stage F-statistic for joint signiﬁcance of 279, well above the standard cutoff of 10. Each instrument is individually statistically signiﬁcant in the predicted direction as well.20 In the second
stage, we estimate that passage of a mandate increases the BMI of diabetics by
19
We focus on binding term limits (that is, the variable does not take the value of one as soon
as the state passes the term limit; instead, it takes the value of one starting in the ﬁrst year in which
the limit will have an effect on who may run for the legislature). We do this to limit the correlation
between current voter preferences and the effect of term limits on legislator decision making. Since
these laws are generally passed many years before they take effect, any correlation between the
existence of a binding term limit law and current political preferences in a state will be attenuated,
especially given that we control independently for state ﬁxed effects in both stages of the instrumental
variables analysis.
20
The existence of term limits decreases the likelihood of adopting a diabetes mandate by nearly
15 percent (p p .000), and a prohibition on corporate campaign contributions is associated with an
increase in the likelihood of mandate adoption of about 36 percent (p p .000).
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Table 7
Effect of Diabetes Mandates on Body Mass Index: Diabetics Only

Variable
Mandate
Contribution prohibition, ﬁrst stage
Term limits, ﬁrst stage
F-statistic for instruments in ﬁrst stage
Hansen J-statistic

Coefﬁcient

Robust SE

2.389
.360
⫺.147
278.970
.519

1.027
.016
.011

p-Value

.000
.471

Note. Results are from instrumental variables analysis examining only diabetics. Data are from Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (http://www.cdc.gov/brfss/
), for the years 1996–2000. In addition to the instruments presented here, the ﬁrst-stage equation included
all covariates presented in Table 3 except diabetic. Full ﬁrst-stage results are available on request. N p
18,700; R2 p .090.

more than 2 points, an increase of about 8 percent. The increase is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 2 percent level. Further, our test of overidentifying restrictions
suggests that our instruments are orthogonal to BMI.
One possible alternate hypothesis for our result is that passage of a diabetes
mandate induces diabetics who are relatively less healthy to move into the state
to receive diabetes beneﬁts. While the BRFSS does not provide data that could
help us rule out this possibility (such as an indicator for how long an individual
has lived in the state), because we do ﬁnd such a large effect (6 percent) in such
a short period of time (less than 3 years for results presented in Table 4), it
would seem unlikely that migration could be completely driving our result, given
the costs of moving and changing jobs. If migration were driving our results,
we might expect to observe an increase in the number of diabetics in mandate
states after the mandate goes into effect. The BRFSS data do not show any such
relationship.21
7. Conclusion
The incidence of diabetes is on the rise. The nearly $100 billion cost of diabetes
and its complications represents only a small fraction of the true burden of this
disease that is the sixth leading cause of death in the United States. Believing
that this burden is likely to grow, a majority of the states have passed mandates
requiring insurers to cover medical treatments for the disease.
This increased access to treatment could induce a moral hazard problem
whereby individuals rationally substitute away from preventive measures such
as a healthful diet and exercise routine when the effective price of medical
treatments is lowered. However, among diabetics, mandates have the potential
to improve access to self-management supplies and educational resources. Thus,
the net public health effect of mandates is ambiguous.
21
The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data indicate that when a state passes a diabetes
mandate, the percentage of its population with diabetes increases by .0007, and the result is not
statistically signiﬁcant at even the 50 percent level.
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Using microdata from the BRFSS in a DDD framework, we ﬁnd that the
passage of diabetes beneﬁt mandates worsens the health of diabetics relative to
nondiabetics within mandate states, controlling for contemporaneous changes
in the gap between diabetics and nondiabetics in nonmandate states. This suggests
that diabetes beneﬁt mandates might be counterproductive in improving the
health of diabetics. At a minimum, it suggests that any cost-beneﬁt analysis of
these mandates needs to account for this offsetting behavior.
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